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Abstract
We justify generalisations of weak values from a tentatively relational
perspective by deriving them from a generalisation of Bayes’ rule. We also
argue that these generalisations have implications of quantum nonlocality
and may form a novel approach to quantum gravity and cosmology.
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Introductory Remarks
Weak values are often invoked as a generalisation of expectation values in quan-
tum theory [1, 2, 3]. Curiously, however, such values can be outside the set
of eigenvalues of their corresponding operators or even complex so, like Feyn-
man’s ‘negative probabilities’ [4], such values cannot be interpreted strictly us-
ing orthodox statistics. Nonetheless, they behave with a curious, and somehow
consistent, logic [5]. Without a clear interpretation or derivation it is hard to
promote such weak values as fundamental or necessary; we need to derive that
we must use such things from a foundational standpoint. Luckily, we have a
convenient generalisation of weak values to hand: complex objects that we call
‘pedagogical examples’ or ‘pegs’ [6]. This paper reviews what pegs are [6] and
outlines why we use them, and why they are specifically a generalisation of weak
values. Pegs are axiomatically and relationally defined so we argue that they
are natural in quantum theory—we do not use the orthodox ensemble interpre-
tation of probability in order to derive them. Thus we absolve any problems
with frequentist derivations of weak probabilities that lie outside the interval
[0, 1] or even outside the set of real numbers. We will then discuss a few reasons
why the use of orthodox statistics in quantum theory, and generalisations, is
comparatively unnatural—using orthodox statistics we get quantum nonlocal-
ity, nonadditivity, and no clear path for tentative generalisations of quantum
theory.
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Weak Values and Pegs
In the standard ensemble interpretation of quantum theory we pre-select an ini-
tial state and then work out the relative frequencies of results of measurements.
One can also retrodict by post-selecting information or one can both pre- and
post-select information and infer about events or observables between such se-
lections. This is what weak values are; they are generalised expectation values
of observables conditioned both on pre- and post-selected information.
In the orthodox frequentist interpretation of probabilities pre- and post-
selection occurs by choosing to include only certain cases within a given ensem-
ble. One includes only those runs in which a particular initial state (a particular
outcome of a previous measurement) was sent into the device and in which a
particular outcome was received. We can then try and make inferences about
the values of observables between pre- and post-selection. The weak value of an
observable A is defined to be
Aw =
〈Φ|Aˆ|Ψ〉
〈Φ|Ψ〉
(1)
where we have pre-selected a state |Ψ〉 and post-selected a state |Φ〉. Although
these weak values can lie outside of the set of eigenvalues of the operator Aˆ, they
still seem to behave in a curiously consistent manner. Clearly they cannot be
interpreted using orthodox statistics—projection operators Pˆ are observables
and thus can have weak values i.e. one can have negative or complex weak
probabilities. Thus, if we are to derive or interpret weak values foundationally
we must go outside of the orthodox statistical analysis because relative frequen-
cies can always be placed in the interval [0, 1]. Note that the key idea in weak
value theory is that weak values arise as a novel form of probabilistic inference
[5]. Luckily there is a form of statistics, distinct from orthodox statistics, that
is framed in exactly this manner: Bayesian probability theory [7].
Kastner has connected the ideas in histories formalisms to weak values [8]
although we wish to outline and derive this connection further. So we wish to
find a generalisation of weak probabilities in a histories formalism which are
derived explicitly within the framework of Bayesian probabilistic inference. We
do not have to go far to find such a generalisation; we have postulated [9] and
then derived [6] such pedagogical examples recently. So, we can derive weak
probabilities and generalisations from a Bayesian axiomatic standpoint without
having to invoke dubious notions of negative or complex relative frequencies.
Let us summarise the basic results of [6] so as to explain what these pedagogical
examples—‘pegs’—are.
There exists a convenient histories formalism in the literature, namely the
History Projection Operator (HPO) formalism introduced by Isham [10]. One
defines ‘history propositions’ α, β, γ... ∈ P(V) which behave in ways analogous
to projection operators (i.e. there exist logical connectives analogous to the
∧,∨ and ¬ connectives in quantum logic)—V is a large Hilbert space and P(V)
is its associated set of projection operators. There is an additional natural
logical connective that connects different temporal orderings which we call ⊳.
If we wish to promote a Bayesian approach then the simplest thing to do is
simply to apply analogues of Cox’s axioms of probability theory [12] to this
histories propositional algebra. Cox’s approach is not the only formulation of
Bayesian probability theory but it is the form we adopt here for pragmatic
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reasons (for a clear introduction to this form of Bayesian probability theory
see [7]). Cox originally gave two axioms of probability theory that are related
to how the ‘and’ and ‘negation’ logical connectives behave in Boolean logic.
This is where we can bring in a relational spin to Cox’s probability theory.
Relational theories are used to pragmatically ensure that factitious relationships
are never introduced in physical theories. In probability theory one does not
wish to introduce any functional relationships between probabilities within the
probability space that aren’t rationally justified by the underlying propositional
algebra. This is exactly what Cox’s axioms ensure. Cox’s ∧-axiom is
p(α ∧ β|I) := F [p(α|βI), p(β|I)], (2)
where F is an arbitrary function that is sufficiently well-behaved for our pur-
poses. Similarly, Cox’s ¬-axiom is that the probability we assign to the negation
of a proposition should only functionally depend upon the probability of the
proposition before it was negated:
p(¬α|I) := G[p(α|I)]. (3)
These axioms ensure that we do not introduce any further functional rela-
tionships between the relevant probabilities (for we are not justified in doing so).
Of course we are being a bit na¨ıve here because Cox applied these axioms to
Boolean propositional algebras and not to quantum ones but, still, the key prop-
erties of the logical connectives are still satisfied: the ∧-connective is associative
such that α ∧ (β ∧ γ) = (α ∧ β) ∧ γ = α ∧ β ∧ γ and the ¬-connective behaves
such that if you apply it twice you get the same proposition back again. We do
not need an analogous ∨-axiom in the Boolean case because the logical connec-
tives are logically dependent. In quantum theories the ‘or’ operation does not
distribute with the ‘and’ operation but, nonetheless, we can still na¨ıvely apply
these axioms and see if we get something useful.
Note that when going from an algebra of propositions to an algebra of ‘his-
tory propositions’ we naturally introduce a further logical connective, one that
relates the different temporal orderings of the individual propositions within the
‘history proposition’. We can define the operation ⊳ to reverse the temporal
ordering (both dynamical and kinematical) of a history proposition. This means
that the ⊳-operation behaves like the ¬-operation in that if you apply it twice to
a ‘history proposition’ you get the same ‘history proposition’ back again. Thus
we need an ⊳-axiom analogous to the ¬-axiom:
p(⊳α|I) := H [p(α|I)], (4)
where H is also an arbitrary function that is sufficiently well-behaved for our
purposes. One cannot always use real numbers for this Bayesian approach be-
cause the ⊳-axiom adds an ‘extra degree of freedom’ to the associated proba-
bilistic notions. In the history of science we have all been rather vague about
what we mean when we say the word ‘probability’. It is a vague word that
is often used in a variety of very specific ways which confuses the discussion.
Let us name these assignments p(α|I) ‘pedagogical examples’ or ‘pegs’ so as to
be specifically vague rather than vaguely specific. We have named them such
for a variety of reasons. Firstly we don’t have to change the notation because
‘pegs’ starts with a ‘p’. Secondly, the name hints at a metaphor for the whole
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premise of the programme: we are trying to the find the ‘right’ peg to fit to
corresponding hole. We don’t, for example, want to make the childish blunder
of bashing a square peg into a round hole. In [6] we argued that a corresponding
set of pegs for the HPO algebra are complex numbers:
p(α|I) = trV(αYI), (5)
where the YI operators are defined on the large Hilbert space V . We proved this
using an analogue of Gleason’s theorem which in turn was based on an analogue
in the literature by Isham, Linden and Schreckenberg [13]. This means that our
complex pegs are in one-to-one correspondence with operators YI on V (for dim
V > 2) in analogy to Gleason’s theorem [14] where probability assignments in
the interval [0, 1] are in one-to-one correspondence with density matrices on H
(for dim H > 2). For details see [6, 13]. All we wish to emphasise here is that
these pegs are derived axiomatically from a foundationally relational approach.
We do not need to use orthodox statistics to find them. We now wish to show
that these pegs are explicitly history generalisations of weak values of projection
operators.
We define a homogeneous history proposition α as a time ordered tensor
product of projection operators αˆtm ∈ P(H):
α := αˆtn(tn)⊗ αˆtn−1(tn−1)⊗ ...⊗ αˆt1(t1). (6)
We stay in the Heisenberg picture such that each projection operator has the
dynamics already implicit such that αˆtm(tm) = Uˆ
†(tm− tm−1)αˆtm Uˆ(tm− tm−1)
where αˆtm are Schro¨dinger picture projection operators.
Note that we can always rewrite trH(Cαρˆ) in the form of (5) where the class
operator Cα is given by Cα := αˆtn(tn)αˆtn−1(tn−1)...αˆt1 (t1), V := ⊗
nH and ρˆ is
a density matrix on H [6, 13]. So at least a subset of our pegs are of the form
trH(Cαρˆ). We can use this to connect our pegs to weak values.
If we apply (1) to projection operators we get
Pw =
〈Φ|Pˆ |Ψ〉
〈Φ|Ψ〉
(7)
which could be termed a weak probability. In general such weak probabilities are
complex (also see [15]) and they are related to our pegs in the following manner.
When we pre- and post-select then we are effectively making measurements and
choosing to consider only a particular result. We choose to represent such results
with pure density matrices, or equivalently with projection operators. Thus we
can rewrite (7) as a peg. Let us take the history propostion α that consists
of a series of three projection operators ordered in time. We pre-select with
Pˆ|Ψ〉 = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| and post-select with Pˆ|Φ〉 = |Φ〉〈Φ|. Our peg for the history
α = Pˆ|Φ〉 ⊗ Pˆ ⊗ Pˆ|Ψ〉 is
p(α|I) = trH(Cα) = 〈Ψ|Φ〉〈Φ|Pˆ |Ψ〉 (8)
= 〈Ψ|Φ〉Pw〈Φ|Ψ〉 (9)
= |〈Ψ|Φ〉|2Pw. (10)
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Thus our pegs for three-time histories are explicitly trivially related to weak
probabilities. Pegs can be considered as generalisations of weak probabilities in
a full histories formalism.
A compelling way to derive such weak values is through a generalisation of
Bayes’ rule [9]. Note that
|〈Ψ|Φ〉|2 = trH(Pˆ|Φ〉Pˆ|Ψ〉) = p(α
′|I) (11)
where α′ = Pˆ|Φ〉 ⊗ 1ˆ⊗ Pˆ|Ψ〉. Thus we have that
Pw = p(α|α
′I) =
p(α|I)
p(α′|I)
(12)
such that p(α′|αI) = 1. Hence weak probabilities can be explicitly derived
by a conditionalisation using a generalisation of Bayes’ rule! Hence we have
a generalised method to conditionalise pegs, although with novel results that
need to be justified (this generalised Bayes’ rule only behaves like one expects
for commuting histories [9]). This approach may allow us to conditionalise upon
whole histories rather than just pre- and post-selection.
We have derived such entities through a relational Bayesian approach rather
than use the problematic ensemble interpretation of probability. There is no
a priori justification for weak values in an ensemble approach to probability.
Note that there are tentative physical justifications for weak values in terms of
weak measurements [2, 3]—we do not wish to contradict such an idea, rather
we compliment it with a Bayesian generalisation of such objects so that we
don’t have to worry about nonsensical ideas like negative or complex relative
frequencies.
Negative probabilities can be pragmatically justified [4] by escaping the fre-
quency approach but still they do not obey natural axioms of probability. Note
also that we do not contradict a relative frequency or decoherence approach
through this work. Such theories can be derived from ours by taking the real
parts of pegs and enforcing consistency conditions so that they have the neces-
sary limit stability properties [16]. This is arguably what the consistent histories
programme is about [17, 18, 19]. Similarly, the linearly positive histories for-
malism [20] and Hartle’s virtual probabilities formalism [21] both use the real
parts of pegs.
Quantum Theory Applications
It is very interesting that this approach seems to be explicitly relational. Leib-
niz’s two principles of relationalism—the principle of sufficient reason and the
principle of identifying the indiscernible—are very general and can apply as
principles of physical science, not just to theories of spacetime. One uses a re-
lational approach simply for pragmatic reasons; it ensures that only rationally
and physically justified elements are introduced in the theory—this helps in
designing a theory which makes clear sense. Thus relationalism is explicitly a
philosophy about theory building and not an interpretation one takes for an
existing theory. We have argued that we can use this approach for generalising
quantum theory by using analogues of Cox’s axioms. Cox’s axioms explicitly
ensure that we only introduce functional relations between probabilities when
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we are rationally justified in doing so (due to the underlying structure of the
propositional algebra).
This may also have implications for quantum nonlocality. We will present an
analogy with general relativity. General relativity is not a wholly background
independent theory [22] but clearly Einstein used relationalism in order to de-
rive it. Einstein argued that the only elements in spacetime theories that are
rationally justified are spacetime coincidences. A relational approach must then
ensure that one does not introduce relationships other than spacetime coinci-
dences. One wishes to ‘add the least’ to the catalogue of spacetime coincidences
[23]. It is this reasoning that led him to general relativity. We wish to do
an analogous thing beginning with quantum theory and relationships between
probabilities. We can try and define probability theory relationally and thus
naturally get to novel quantum probabilistic notions that are foundationally
well-defined. We wish to do such a thing because we do not consider the ortho-
dox relative frequency approach suitable as we have problems in quantum theory
because of it; namely nonadditivity [24], nonlocality and infinite ensembles.
Relationalism helped Einstein bring locality back to gravitational physics
[25], perhaps we can do an analogous thing with locality in quantum theory.
Clearly we must tackle the issues that Bell brought to the table.
Bell proved that no hidden variable model (that obeys intuitive assumptions)
can be used to emulate the correlations we find in certain correlated quantum
systems [26]. If we postulate variables that pre-exist measurement that aren’t
effected by measurements or actions happening at spacelike separation then
we can’t, it seems, use such theories to emulate quantum theory. This is why
many refer to an implicit ‘nonlocality’ in quantum theory. To put it another
way, he proved that quantum theory cannot be completed by using such hidden
variables. One can also validly argue that Bell proved that quantum theory
itself cannot obey those same intuitive assumptions, so it either embodies causal
nonlocalities or is not a hidden variable completion of itself. This is a result that
goes against all our na¨ıve assumptions about how the world works—a paradigm
shifting body of work.
Of course, it is commonly accepted that Bell’s analysis doesn’t prove that
quantum theory necessarily embodies causal nonlocalities because it is not nec-
essarily claimed that quantum theory is its own hidden variable completion. It
certainly isn’t, as Bell amazingly proved, its own local hidden variable com-
pletion (although Bell acknowledged that one might easily have qualms with
his definition of locality [27]). We can thus either accept nonlocality in quan-
tum theory or we can try and approach quantum theory from a direction that
necessarily ensures that we cannot justifiably introduce hidden variables while
making the same predictions; and then it tentatively might be the case that we
also get to keep locality. Nonlocality might then be a factitious problem that
is brought to the table by bringing hidden variables to the table (while making
the same predictions as quantum theory). However, if one equates hidden vari-
ables with realism then the hidden variable hypothesis is hard to throw away.
Hopefully we will convince you that it is not so difficult to throw away at all.
From a relational perspective, a ‘complete’ theory is one which explains
all the physics by introducing only rationally justified theoretical relationships.
Thus perhaps we can still ‘complete’ quantum theory. This use of the word
‘complete’ conflicts with the way that the word is used in terms of completing
quantum mechanics by appending hidden variables. Thus, to differentiate the
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two uses, we will write the relational use of the word ‘complete’ in scare quotes.
We argue that there is, at present, sufficient ambiguity in the physics we do to
justify either profound truth: nonlocality or ‘completeness’.
Let us first discuss how hidden variable theorists attempt to complete quan-
tum theory and then we shall propose why and how we can ‘complete’ it. In
quantum theory one cannot consistently assign values to observables prior to
measurement. This is arguably proved by the Bell-Kochen-Specker theorem
[26, 28]. We say ‘arguably’ because recent valuations seem to nullify this the-
orem [29, 30]. However, such valuations are necessarily so pathological so as
to be experimentally unverifiable and thus we must be happy to remain ig-
norant of such valuations [31]. Bayesianism is a way to remain happy in the
light of this theorem because one explicitly presumes that one is ignorant of such
valuations—hence why we discuss probabilities. In that sense quantum mechan-
ics is trivially incomplete. We wish to show more than this; quantum theory is
necessarily incomplete because it is a theory of our ignorance. If something is
necessarily incomplete then why worry that it behaves in an odd manner when
attempting to complete it? Thus we argue that completing quantum theory,
while maintaining its predictions, is a category error. One must either derive a
successor to quantum theory or ‘complete’ it. Instead of trying to complete a
theory of ignorance by presuming more than we can rationally justify, we should
‘complete’ our theory of ignorance by only presuming that that we can rationally
justify while making all the relevant predictions. We take a relational approach
so as to attempt to ‘complete’ quantum theory explicitly because relationalism
is about designing physical theories such that one does not need to add anything
to the catalogue of relations in order to make the relevant predictions—what
else could we mean by the term ‘complete’?1 We need to make things as simple
as possible—and not any simpler.
This is where the analogy with background independence might help; al-
though note that it is clearly only an analogy. We choose to use general relativity
because it is partially background independent. We choose to use background
independent theories because we take a relational approach. If we do choose
a particular background then how are we to know whether the odd features
(say nonlocality) of our theory are due to that, seemingly arbitrary, choice?
We choose to identify these indiscernible backgrounds so that we don’t end up
invoking the vagaries of a particular arbitrarily chosen background. Nor do
we end up invoking the vagaries—if there are any—that come about by choos-
ing any particular background (vagaries that are universal to backgrounds). If
we can show that hidden variable theories are not rationally justified then we
must, relationally, reject them. (We could then argue that Cox’s Bayesianism is
to quantum mechanics as Leibniz’s relationalism is to general relativity. Both
Cox’s Bayesianism and Leibniz’s relationalism consist of criteria of rationality.
Furthermore, since relationalism isn’t necessarily a philosophy about space-time
1A building is ‘complete’ if it stands and functionally satisfies its design brief. One could
add any number of spurious features without effecting its function—flowers, art, monkey but-
lers and so forth—but such additions clearly do not ‘complete’ the building even if they make
it look pretty (this is not to say that art, flowers and monkey butlers can’t be incorporated
functionally into buildings, nor that our task shouldn’t be to try and functionally incorporate
such things; but if they were to be incorporated then we might manifestly have a new design
brief and would probably wish to ‘complete’ a different building with a different catalogue of
funcitons). Simply put, quantum theory stands and we can frame it such that it satisfies its
minimal probabilistic catalogue of functions; it is a relational theory of ignorance.
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but rather a philosophy of science in general, we could say that Cox’s theory
is a relational theory of probability—although perhaps we confuse the issue by
doing so.) Clearly a particular background would complete general relativity.
However, it is a category error to complete general relativity in such a manner.
Hence we should rather call general relativity ‘complete’ since we do not need
to add anything to the catalogue of spacetime coincidences in order to make
the relevant predictions. This is not to say that no theory will ever superseed
quantum theory or general relativity—we do not mean ‘complete’ to be synony-
mous with ‘final’—we just use the word ‘complete’ to emphasise that we should
not complete theories in an irrational manner if they are rational (one should
instead design a rational successor). Perhaps there is a better word to use.
Now we need to present an argument that hidden variables are not rationally
justified in a probability theory. We will do so by introducing what we call
demon observers, showing that invoking them is equivalent to invoking hidden
variables, then emphasising that we have no rational reason to invoke them.
In quantum theory we cannot assign physical values to all variables, but
we can assign probabilities to variables. We explicitly assign probabilities to
a variable because we don’t know which physical value, out of a given set of
values, that variable takes. If we did know which value the variable takes then
we would not need a theory of probability. Someone who does know the value
that a variable takes—particularly a value that a variable ‘hidden’ from us
takes—we call a demon observer. Such demon observers live inside urns and
measuring devices and they know the values of certain variables even if we don’t.
We cannot rationally presume that these demon observers, as long as they are
uncommunicative, effect our predictions, but it might be that they are a useful
pedagogical device. So, when we do an experiment we sometimes do not know
what physical value a certain variable takes. There are many possible values
that it could take (in a counterfactual sense) and we can tentatively list them.
Often ignorance is associated with an ignorance as to which counterfactually
distinct possibility is actually the case or equivalently an ignorance of what a
demon observer sees. However, knowing which value is the case alters the demon
observer’s probabilistic predictions (he clearly knows more than we do). This
is fine if we are ourselves the demon observer and come to know which value is
the case; we just update our predictions. However if we posit ‘hidden’ variables
then we come across a problem—these demon observers are uncommunicative.
There is no reason to presume that a theory of a demon observer’s ignorance
is operationally equivalent to a theory of our ignorance—demon observes know
far more than we do (the values of hidden variables or their prior-probabilities
for example). Demon observers who know the hidden configuration will predict
different probabilities for future (or past) events in comparison to an observer
who does not know the ‘hidden’ configuration. Thus we must distinguish theo-
ries that involve demon observers from those that involve a single no-nonsense
observer. It is clear that the former is irrational (we invoke little imp-like ob-
servers who we cannot communicate with) and the later obeys simple plausible
criteria of rationality. Bell proved that if we can communicate with these demon
observers, while making the same predictions, then we must get some form of
nonlocality—however, it is utterly plausible, one might say inevitable, that if
we were able to communicate with demon observers then we would manifestly
make different predictions. Hence we nullify any curious claims that Bell’s anal-
ysis logically implies reality, or quantum theory, necessarily embodies causal
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nonlocalities. By far the more controversial claim (locality being plausible but
tentative), is the claim that a probability theory can be ‘complete’.
Thus it seems that we reject realism but this is not the case. Probability
theory is a theory of ignorance so we explicitly assume that we cannot assign
values to things (hence we are profoundly happy with the B-K-S theorem). In
probability theories we explicitly assume that variables have values—we just
don’t know what they are and we cannot consistently assign values to things
while making the same probabilistic predictions. If we were to assume that vari-
ables don’t have values then we would not even have the basis for a probability
theory! We might be able to assign values to things by making novel predictions,
so some theory might yet superseed quantum theory to shine light on such hid-
den variables—we have nothing against hidden variable theories in this sense.
It is tautological however that quantum theory is not its own successor and it
is vacuous to call quantum theory incomplete because of this tautology—every
theory would then be incomplete. It does not necessarily follow that quantum
theory can be ‘completed’ but we argue that it can because it can be framed as
a rational theory of our ignorance using pegs (cf. our analogy with background
independence). While writing this paper we found another that makes similar
strong claims [32] (and it is interesting that such claims are also made within a
relational approach).
Having recognised the domain of Bell’s work, many authors have attempted
to extend and generalise the discussion without having to use the probabilistic
assumptions that Bell used. Some good examples are the exciting programmes
started by Hardy [33] and Stapp [34]. Stapp’s programme, for example, is in
opposition to the tentative view given above; it is an attempt to prove that
causal nonlocalities are necessarily embodied by quantum theory. Stapp’s work,
however, has recently been criticised by Shimony [35]. One could argue that
probabilities are not well-defined independently of events in space-like separated
regions—they are manifestly defined with respect to such regions. (Note the
distinction between a probability that is well-defined due to an ignorance of
spacelike separated events and a probability that is independent of knowledge
of spacelike separated events; the latter is ill-defined.) Similarly, Shimony argues
that the counterfactual statements that Stapp invokes are also not well-defined
independently of space-like separated regions—counterfactual statements are
manifestly defined relative to such regions. Such interdependencies between the
very definitions of certain probabilities or between the very definitions of certain
counterfactual statements may be interpreted in an entirely logical manner—
thus we need not necessarily invoke nonlocal causal relations to explain them.
Thus it is not yet clear that such programmes prove that causal nonlocalities
are necessarily a component of quantum theory. Of course, all this relates to
the perennial debate started by the conflict between the EPR paper [36] and
Bohr’s response [37].
Clearly we haven’t argued that quantum theory is a local theory. We are just
not convinced that it necessarily embodies causal nonlocalities. Bell’s profound
analysis tells us that, if we wish to tentatively deny nonlocality, we need to either
approach quantum theory from a novel perspective or make novel predictions; we
have attempted to do the former and leave the latter for a profound revolution in
sub-quantum physics. For further relational ideas in regards to quantum theory
see [38, 39, 40]. Perhaps it seems that we have been very dismissive of hidden
variable theories; note rather that we have been very conservative in arguing
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only that hidden variables should not be used in deciding whether a probability
theory is ‘complete’ (by definition a probability theory is one in which we do
not assign realistic values to those variables that are ‘hidden’ from us—hence
we assign probabilities instead).
Quantum Gravity Applications
Our Bayesian approach is also itself ripe for generalisation. One takes a propo-
sitional algebra and derives pegs relationally using the logical connectives of the
algebra. With a novel propositional algebra, say in quantum gravity or quantum
cosmology, one will derive novel pegs. Thus we have a tentatively constructive
approach.
Above we presented an analogy between Leibniz’s relationalism and Cox’s
Bayesianism. However we think that there is something deeper than just an
analogy here. Note for example that hidden variable theories require a particular
reference frame/background [33]. It might be that approaching quantum theory
in a way analogous to relationalism we might make some first tentative steps
on an approach to quantum gravity. It is commonly considered a pre-requisite
that theories of quantum gravity are more relational than general relativity (we
try and remove as much background structure as possible [22]). Note that this
is not to say that quantum gravity must uniquely be relational. Once we have
found quantum gravity it might be that we could interpret it in a variety of
ways [41]. Relationalism is an approach we take for opportunistic reasons, it
is explicitly a pragmatic philosophy of theory building and we physicists are
theory builders; we remain silent about how we are to interpret the theory in
the end for that is something we cannot speak of yet. We thus consider Cox’s
Bayesian probability theory (or rather relational generalisations of probability
theory) to also be a pre-requisite. In the light of quantum cosmology we cannot
use orthodox statistics anyway because we cannot make an ensemble of our
universe to test except as a pedagogical device—Bayesianism is, at present, the
only real alternative to orthodox statistics and Bayesianism is, in the least,
honest about using pedagogical devices.
In order to tentatively begin to apply these relational probabilistic ideas to
quantum gravity we need a propositional algebra on which to apply analogues
of Cox’s axioms. There are a few possibilities in the literature. Markopoulou’s
acausal sets [42] and Savvidou’s covariant histories [43] are two prime examples.
We need a set of propositions which involve logical connectives. If we have ana-
logues of the four we used above we will perhaps end up using complex numbers,
or discrete analogues of complex numbers. But we may have more connectives
in general, perhaps involving an explicit notion of causality. There also may
exist generalisations of Bayesian probability theory that apply to Heyting al-
gebras which might also be applicable in cosmological reasoning [44]—this we
intend to investigate. These ideas are so tentative we do not wish to comment
on them further except to note that Hardy has recently introduced a framework
in which one can have both relational spacetime and probabilistic concepts from
the outset [45]. It is perhaps not a priori valid to assume that quantum gravity
will be a probabilistic theory, however this is our working hypothesis.
One might even be able to take the analogy with relationalism further. We
have previously introduced complex assignments but perhaps we should only
discuss the rational relationships between assignments. Any assignments that
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obey Cox’s axioms would do to an extent, but by choosing a particular type of
assignment one might introduce vagaries particular to those assignments, and
we should identify them all because we have no reason to choose one type of
assignment over another (they are indiscernibles). This might help with issues
we have in regards to the a priori use of real and complex numbers in quantum
theory [46]. We hope to investigate this tentative analogy between Leibniz’s
relationalism and Cox’s Bayesianism further in future work.
There are teasing links between this approach and toposophic approaches in
the literature [47, 48] based around a reformulation of the Bell-Kochen-Specker
theorem. Instead of attempting (and failing) to assign values to variables in
quantum theory one can assign generalised valuations in an attempt to main-
tain some form of realism in quantum theory. This is particularly desired in
quantum cosmology. These generalised valuations maintain functional relation-
ships between observables and the logical relationships between propositions. In
[47] the logical structure is different to what we have assumed above and there
is a further element of contextuality. However, the analogy with relationalism
may still hold for generalised valuations. Pegs and probabilities are generalised
valuations of sorts and it might be useful to use them in such an approach.
Conclusions
We conclude that weak values and generalisations—which we call pegs—can be
derived from a Coxian analysis. This tentatively absolves problems we have
with deriving such notions, and with deriving probabilities themselves, using
orthodox statistics. We argue that we can give a relational interpretation of
such pegs; this provides an analogy between Leibniz’s relationalism in spacetime
and Cox’s approach to probability theory that we can use to tentatively deny
quantum nonlocality. We argue that this approach is ripe for generalisation in
that one could begin to apply these ideas to novel propositional algebras—it
is not clear how to apply orthodox quantum theory to such things. Perhaps
we could apply a pragmatic relational notion of probability to a relational, but
propositional, notion of spacetime. In a certain limit (or limits), we might then
be able to get standard quantum theory and general relativity back again (for
very tentative discussions about such limits see [49] and [50] respectively).
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